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Abstract
Argentina is a federal republic located in South
America. Despite Argentina’s redemocratization in
1983, conditions favoring human rights abuses still
persist. Institutional violence refers to structured
practices of human rights violation by state officials
belonging to public institutions. In this paper, we
outline and discuss privacy issues in institutional
violence complaints in Argentina. To this aim, we
defined a BPMN process model for registering victims’
complaints in a database, and proposed an approach
to investigate the privacy of such process from a threat
modeling perspective. With the approach, we identified
privacy threats of information disclosure and content
unawareness, and defined privacy requirements and
controls needed to mitigate these threats.

1. Introduction
Argentina is a federal republic member of the G-20
world's largest economies and is second in size and
third in population in South America. It is a federation
of twenty-three provinces and one autonomous city,
Buenos Aires. Provinces hold all the power they chose
not to delegate to the federal government. They must
be representative republics in compliance with the
Federal Constitution.
Despite Argentina’s redemocratization in 1983,
conditions favoring human rights abuses still persist
[1]. Specific human rights abuses (e.g., torture,
disappearances, and murder) that resemble practices
common under dictatorship's state terrorism (1976 to
1983) continue to take place [1]. The law prohibits
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment and provides penalties for it.
In 2012, the National Registry of Cases of Torture
and/or Maltreatment (NRCT) attempted to comply
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with international human right treatments. The NRCT
encourages the operational implementation of the
optional protocol to the convention against torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment [8]. For this, concrete cases of violation of
rights and torture are registered through regular visits
to confinement places, and by spontaneous
communications of victims and their relatives to the
Office of Procurator and Commissioner.
As a result, the Criminal Court of Cassation’s
Office in Buenos Aires reported that there were 265
complaints of torture and mistreatment by law
enforcement officers during arrest or institutional
confinement from January to April 2015. On the other
hand, the Office of Public Defenders in the province of
Santa Fe reported 180 complaints from December 2014
to September 2015 [2].
Institutional violence refers to structured practices
of human rights violation by state officials belonging
to public institutions such as security forces, armed
forces, prison services and health effectors in contexts
of restriction of autonomy and/or liberty, e.g., arrests,
imprisonments, custodies, cares, hospitalizations, etc.
Since complaints may individualize abusers (e.g.,
police officers), some victims express reluctance to
make judicial complaints because of their fear of
physical, mental and access rights reprisals adopted by
state officials after each complaint.
In this context, protecting privacy of victims’
complaints is an imperative concern. Hung and Cheng
[4] define information privacy as “an individual’s right
to determine how, when, and to what extent
information about the self will be released to another
person or to an organization.” Privacy rules can be
achieved through privacy preserving mechanisms such
as encryption and access control. In this work, we
outline and discuss privacy issues in institutional
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violence complaints in Argentina. To this aim, we
defined a BPMN (Business Process Model and
Notation) [19] process model for registering victims’
complaints in a database, and proposed an approach to
investigate the privacy of such process from a threat
modeling perspective. The approach was adapted from
Microsoft’s Threat Modeling Principles [12] and
STRIDE Model [13], and the LINDDUN methodology
[17]. By applying the approach, we identified privacy
threats and defined privacy requirements and controls
needed to mitigate these threats.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides a literature review. Section 3 presents the
procedure for surveying institutional violence
complaints in Argentina. Section 4 presents privacy
threat assessment. Section 5 provides a study on
privacy threats. Section 6 concludes the paper and
presents future work.

2. Related work
There are a number of related research works in
this area. For example, Debnath et al. [15] conceptually
designed the IT support for human rights watching,
police transparency and police performance evaluation
in the province of Chubut, Argentina. To this aim, they
proposed a web application, which tracks and records
Police Station activities and provide citizens the
opportunity to evaluate Police performance, and hence
it can be used as human rights watching tool.
Van den Braak et al. [14] proposed a framework to
support secure data integration and sharing for
interorganizational collaboration in the public sector. It
requires a trusted third party that manages access
control to personal information and helps protect the
privacy of parties. This framework could be useful for
the exchange of data between the NRCT and other
public organizations or NGOs, but for the tasks of data
collection and registration of cases of torture, it is
necessary to include other security and privacy
methods from the inside. Van Veenstra et al. [25]
found that the main threats to information security and
privacy in several public organizations in the
Netherlands came from the inside. For instance,
“employees of organizations sometimes accessed
information that they did not need in order to perform
their tasks, such as information concerning celebrities”.
Zuiderwijk et al. [10] presented guidelines for
identifying issues for opening up governmental judicial
research data. Guidelines were determined by
investigating the publishing processes at the Dutch
Research and Documentation Centre. They determined
the following issues that should be taken into account
when opening up a dataset: confidentiality, deletion
policies, embargo placement, cost and time

consumption, ownership, privacy-sensitivity and
anonymization, lack of metadata, reuse of data by the
organization itself, policy-sensitivity and unlawfulness.
These guidelines could be useful to minimize
information disclosure of complaints in the NRCT.
Van den Braak et al. [9] described how judicial data
can be collected, combined, and analyzed such that the
privacy of individuals in society is not violated. They
explained what safety measures have to be taken in the
process of data integration process to better respect
privacy laws and regulations, and hence minimize the
risk of exposing the identity of individuals.
Parks et al. [20] outline consequences of privacy
safeguard in the healthcare domain. They focus on how
privacy-preserving techniques establish a trade-off
between meeting privacy requirements and the
execution of healthcare processes. These consequences
should be carefully considered when proposing
privacy-preserving techniques for the process of
registering institutional violence complaints.
Koops and Leenes [21] discuss practical
implications of “privacy by design” and the complexity
of encoding data protection requirements in software.
This is because of privacy must co-exist with other
requirements like security, functionality, operational
efficiency, organizational control, business processes,
and usability. The authors conclude that “privacy by
design should be approached less from a ‘code’
perspective, but rather from the perspective of
‘communication’ strategies”. In this regard, there are
privacy design strategies like the proposed by Deng et
al. [17], Hoepman [22], Heurix et al. [23], or Hansen et
al. [24] that consider privacy and data protection
principles from the beginning of the development
process.
The use of workflow management systems
(WfMSs) could be a benefit for privacy strategies,
since they could be applied on conceptual process
models rather than software code, but they entail other
challenges. In this regards, in [5] authors showed
weaknesses of WfMSs to capture and enforce privacy
policies such as conflict of interest, hiding personal
data, or generalizing data, and provide extensions to
the YAWL WfMS to cope with such issues. Similarly,
Mülle et al. [6] and Ciuciu et. al. [3] propose structured
text annotations in BPMN models to define privacy
and security aspects related to users. However, none of
these works explicitly mentions how to identify the
privacy issues to be modeled.
In summary, none of these works has discussed
privacy issues of institutional violence complaints.
Existing work in the public sector focuses on data
integration between different organizations, rather than
on how to identify privacy issues from the inside. On
the other hand, there are extensions to business process
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languages to cope with privacy specifications, but there
is no approach to identify privacy threats from the
beginning in process models. In this work, we propose
an approach taking advantage of BPMN for registering
institutional violence complaints.

3. Procedure for surveying institutional
violence complaints in Argentina
The Optional Protocol to the United Nation (UN)
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT)
establishes a procedure for visits to all places where
persons are deprived of their liberty by independent
international and national monitoring bodies [8].
Argentina was the first State in Latin America to ratify
the OPCAT in 2004. The law for a national system of
prevention was issued in April 2014 and the selection
process of the members of the National Committee to
Prevent Torture is still pending1.
Besides NRCT, six provinces (Chaco, Mendoza,
Misiones, Río Negro, Salta, and Tucumán) have
adopted laws to create local preventive mechanisms to
implement OPCAT, while others (Santa Fe, Neuquén,
Corrientes, Córdoba, San Luis, Tierra del Fuego, and
Buenos Aires) are in the process of debating such laws.
The Santa Fe province created the Provincial Registry
of Cases of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and/or Degrading
Abuse Police and other affectations Bad Practices and
Human Rights within the scope of the Provincial
Public Defense Service (SPPDP).
Figure 1 shows the procedure for collecting and
receiving institutional violence complaints in
Argentina. This procedure refers to public and open
access documents such as laws, resolutions, and reports
of the NRCT and the SPPDP registry. We use the term
registry to refer to the database that contains
information about institutional violence complaints in
the context of the NRCT or the SPPDP registry. There
are five general use cases for surveying and reporting
situations of torture in public institutions.
Referring to the first use case, interviewers visit
institutions where there are people deprived of liberty
such as prisons, reformatories, or hospitals. In those
places, victims are interviewed and fill up the forms to
report new cases of tortures. Forms are sent to the
database administrator. People deprived of liberty
could be in hospitals when they are recovering from a
disease or if they are under psychiatric treatment. In
the second use case, complaints of tortures are received
from witnesses or victims. These complaints are also
1

http://www.apt.ch/en/opcat_pages/opcat-situation84/?pdf=info_country

registered in forms. Then, the forms are sent to the
database administrator. In the third and fourth use
cases, complaints are gathered from information
published on newspapers or from NGOs and other
organizations. For all of these cases, the database
administrator registers all of their forms into the
registry. Referring to the fifth use case, the database
administrator generates statistical reports for their
superior to be published to the public on the internet.

Figure 1. Use cases for surveying and
reporting situations of torture
The form for surveying new cases of institutional
violence was designed to be applied during inspections
to places of penitentiary detention and youth custody.
It is also meant to reconstruct information from
communications by other institutional channels and
surveys conducted by other organizations. As for the
surveys, the interviewer proceeds to complete a form
for each victim that connects one or more acts of
torture and/or ill-treatment suffered in the span of the
last 60 days at the time of the interview. It is assumed
that paper forms are archived and secure.
A technical team edits the information recorded in
confinement places to make it consistent. Then,
information is entered into the registry as shown in
Figure 1. Subsequently new analyses are performed to
process the data statistically and qualitatively for
preparing annual reports or partial reports.
According to Figure 1, the registry stores cases of
abuse and/or torture prosecuted, but also cases reported
to state agencies, human rights or NGOs. In addition to
the most widespread modalities, such as physical
aggressions, the registry considers different types of
ill-treatments and tortures.
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In the surveys, the form for each victim of acts of
torture or ill-treatment (Figure 2) includes data about
the receiving source, the victim and the facts, from a
written summary and a series of closed and open fields
to be completed by the interviewer. The information of
the form is stored in the registry as shown in Figure 1.

4. Privacy threat assessment
In this section, we propose an approach to
investigate the privacy of the procedure presented in
Section 3 from a threat modeling perspective.
When it comes to any information technology,
privacy and security are at the core of ensuring that
goals are achieved effectively and without compromise
of personal data. The three concerns of security are
confidentiality,
integrity
and
availability.
Confidentiality means that access to information is
restricted only to intended parties. Integrity means that
data is accurate and consistent and has not been
tampered with, while availability means that resources
and data remain available when needed by the
legitimate parties.
A security background is required for privacy. In
particular, personally identifiable information is any
type of information that can be linked to an individual,
including their activities, preferences, history,
conversations, etc. Information privacy goals can be
achieved through privacy preserving mechanisms such
as access control, privacy policies, and privacy
preferences.
Privacy policies describe an organization’s data
practices. This includes a description of what
information is collected from users, what the
information is used for, how long it needs to be held, if
and how the information should be shared to third
parties, how long information needs to be retained, etc.
The user gives consent either implicitly or
explicitly. Often, consent is implied just by using the
services. Explicit consent can be given if the user is
required to click “I agree” in regards to the privacy
policy terms and conditions to receive services.
Threat modeling is a useful tool to assess risk
associated with a system and provides a structured
approach to security and privacy. Several approaches
have been developed for threat modeling, one of the
most widely adapted being Microsoft’s Threat
Modeling Process [12] and STRIDE model [13] for
identifying six categories of security threats: Spoofing,
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure,
Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege. This
model presents a systematic approach to understanding
and decomposing an application to identify security
threats, however there is little focus on privacy.

Figure 2. The form (translated from Spanish)
To preserve privacy, there must be a foundation of
security. To achieve this, one must ensure that the
system, for example in this context, the registry in
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Figure 1, has a reasonable level of security
mechanisms in place, and that personal information is
protected from a security perspective.
Deng et al. [17] have developed a methodology
called LINDDUN that provides a comprehensive
privacy threat modeling framework. Like the STRIDE
model, LINDDUN identifies privacy threats by using
similar threat modeling principles (data flow diagrams,
threat trees and trust boundaries) and mapping them to
privacy properties based on the terminology defined by
Pfitzmann et al. [18]. Misuse case scenarios and
privacy threat tree patterns illustrate privacy attack
scenarios, which are then prioritized through risk
assessment techniques. In the final two steps of this
methodology, mapping the privacy threats to privacy
requirements allows for the identification of privacy
enhancing solutions.
The following privacy threats are the basis of the
LINDDUN methodology: (1) linkability, an attacker is
able to distinguish whether two or more items of
interest (e.g. subjects, messages, actions, etc.) are
related or not within the system; (2) identifiability, an
attacker can sufficiently identify a subject associated to
an item of interest, such as the sender of a message; (3)
non-repudiation, this allows an attacker to gather
evidence to counter the claims of the repudiating party
and to prove that a user knows, has done or has said
something; (4) detectability, an attacker can distinguish
whether an item exists or not, e.g. messages are
sufficiently discernible from random noise; (5)
information disclosure,
personal information is
exposed to individuals who are not supposed to have
access to it; (6) content unawareness, a user is unaware
of the information disclosed to the system; (7) policy
and consent noncompliance, this means that even
though the system shows its privacy policies to its
users, there is no guarantee that the system actually
complies to the advertised policies.
The above threats can be categorized into hard or
soft privacy threats [17]. Our focus for this paper is on
soft privacy: information disclosure and content
awareness. Soft privacy is based on the assumption that
the data subject is not in control of personal data, and
must trust the data controllers (service providers). This
is the domain of policies, access control and audit. In
this model, the data subject provides personal data and
the data controller is responsible for it. Policy consent
and noncompliance is beyond the scope of this paper,
which assumes that the system (i.e., the registry in
Figure 1) complies with its privacy policies.
Based on the above threat modeling techniques, we
have adapted our own technique appropriate for
modeling privacy threats in this environment. Below is
the threat modeling process we cover in the following
sections, adapted from Microsoft’s Threat Modeling

Principles [12] and STRIDE Model [13], and the
LINDDUN methodology [17]. We believe that this
would provide an effective analysis of privacy threats
in this procedure. Our approach, illustrated in Figure 3,
uses a similar process as the three models discussed
above, with the largest motivation from LINDDUN.
Starting with an overview of the technical architecture,
we identify personal data assets and data flow. Next,
we use the LINDDUN methodology to identify privacy
threats and threat agents, and illustrate methods of
attack through threat trees.

Figure 3. Threat modeling process

5. Privacy threats in institutional violence
complaints
In this section, we analyze the law related to
privacy in institutional violence complaints in
Argentina, apply the proposed approach, and establish
a discussion in this context.
The law related to institutional violence complaints
consider some aspects related to privacy. However, it
is not sufficient to protect the privacy of individuals.
Law 26.827, Article 45 states that the consent of the
victim to publish their data and personal information in
reports, media or other ways of making the information
public is always required [7]. However, the victim may
not be aware of the consequences of making their data
public. In this regards, the resolution N° 5 of the
SPPDP2 (2012, Annex I. 13) states that the interviewer
should draw the attention of the victim providing
information about the privacy policy of the Provincial
Registry, where he can choose “preserving the identity
of the complainant”. However, this depends on the
interviewer and the resolution does not guarantee
identity preservation.
Law 26.827, Article 47 has to do with preserving
the identity of victims, and state that disclosure of
information could place the victim at risk [7]. Related
to this law, the resolution N° 5 of the SPPDP (2012,
Annex I. 16) states that any person who is somehow
involved in the process of collection, referral,
registration and publication of data shall maintain
absolute confidentiality in relation to victims and
preserve all data coming to their knowledge. However,
these are rather warnings that are not enough to
preserve identity of victims.

2

SPPDP. Resolution 0005. 2012.
http://www.sppdp.gob.ar/site/normativa/resoluciones/indice/
2012/archivo/Resolucion-0005P-2012.pdf

4045

Finally, the resolution N° 5 of the SPPDP (2012,
Annex I. 19) states that the Deputy Secretary of the
Provincial Registry shall arbitrate the means to take the
necessary precautions to make safety records to ensure
the proper safeguarding of data loaded into the
Provincial Registry (e.g., backup, compressing, etc.).
However, Secretary may not be aware of the
precautions necessary to safeguard victim’s data.
5.1 Identify privacy threats
From a policy perspective, any data sharing
practices that may result in any of the LINDDUN
threats discussed in Section 4 should be identified in
the system’s privacy policy. This work depends
heavily on the assumption that the registry or the
procedure has published an accurate privacy policy and
also complies with it.
For the purpose of this paper, we address the threats
of information disclosure and content unawareness.
Information disclosure occurs when a user’s personal
information is exposed to individuals who are not
supposed to have access to it. We assume that although
information disclosure practices are outlined in the
privacy policy, and the user has provided their consent,
the user is not actually aware since they do not read or
understand the policy. Content unawareness occurs

when the user is unaware of the information that is
collected on them, such as their personal information.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
RFC6973 on Privacy Considerations [16] provides
more specific secondary threats that fall under the
categories of information disclosure and content
unawareness. In the proposed model, we attempt to
prevent the following four categories of threats to
victims:
 Surveillance: the observation or monitoring of an
individual’s communications or activities. The effects
of surveillance on the individual can range from
anxiety and discomfort to behavioral changes such as
inhibition and self-censorship, and even to the
perpetration of violence against the individual. The
individual need not be aware of the surveillance so that
it impacts their privacy – the possibility of surveillance
may be enough to harm individual autonomy.
 Secondary use: the use of collected information
about an individual without the individual's consent for
a purpose different from that for which the information
was collected. Secondary use may violate people's
expectations or desires. The potential for secondary use
can generate uncertainty on how one's information is
used in the future, potentially discouraging information
exchange in the first time.

Figure 4. Procedure for surveying institutional violence complaints in BPMN
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 Disclosure: the revelation of information about an
individual that affects the way others judge this
individual. Disclosure can violate individuals'
expectations of the confidentiality of the data they
share. The threat of disclosure may deter people from
engaging in certain activities for fear of reputational
harm, or simply because they do not wish to be
observed.
 Exclusion: the failure to allow individuals to know
about data that others have about them and to
participate in its handling and use. Exclusion reduces
accountability on of entities that maintain information
about people and creates a sense of vulnerability in
relation to individuals' ability to control how
information about them is collected and used.

5.2 Mapping privacy threats to Data Flow
Diagrams
Figure 4 shows the process for investigation of
torture cases by means of a BPMN model. This model
corresponds to use case 1 for collecting victim’s data
described in Figure 1. The process starts when an agent
receives a case. If the agent cannot interview the
victim, they must notify the AIDT (Area of
investigation and documentation of cases of torture)
and the process ends. Otherwise, the agent interviews
the victim. After that, if a second interview is needed,
the agent performs the interview. In parallel, the agent
notifies whether a criminal complaint is needed.
Additionally, a healthcare professional performs a
medical examination in case it is needed, and then
sends the report to the AIDT. Analogously, a
psychiatric professional performs an examination and
then sends the report to the AIDT. Once these activities
are finished, the agent generates a report, the NRCT
includes the case in the registry, and the process ends.
Table 1. Mapping BPMN to DFD elements
Entity
Process
Data Store
Data Flow

User
Investigation of cases of torture
Registry
- User data stream (victim to form)
- Service data stream (form to agent)
- Registry data stream (agent to database)

Since the privacy threat analysis of LINDDUN
makes use of Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) [17], based
on this process model, Table 1 maps the BPMN model
elements to DFD elements, whereas Table 2 maps the
LINDDUN privacy threats to DFD element types (E:
Entity, DF: data flow, DS: data store, P: process).
The threat of information disclosure occurs at the
process, data store and data flow levels. This falls into
the control of the registry, which outlines information
disclosure practices in their privacy policy. While we
assume that the registry has accurate policies as well as
complies with them, the threat we are concerned with
is related to the entity who agrees to disclose the
information.
Content unawareness is a threat to the entity (user).
The user is required to provide the necessary consent to
process personal data. The goal of our model is to
address the threats of content unawareness from the
perspective of the user, putting them in control of
information disclosure. This model addresses
information disclosure from the entity’s perspective
who complies with information disclosure practices.
This model is acting under the assumption that all the
process, data store and data flow elements act in
compliance with their policies and the consent of the
victim.
Table 2. Mapping privacy threats to DFD
elements
Threat
Categories
Linkability
Identifiability
Non-repudiation
Detectability
Information
Disclosure
Content
Unawareness
Policy/Consent
Noncompliance

Entity

Process
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Data
Store
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Data
Flow
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

T

A

A

A

A

A

A

T

Legend: N/A=Not Applicable (Out of scope), T=Threats addressed,
A=Assumed to Comply
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5.3 Methods of attack
In this section, we observe the different methods
an adversary can use to reach the data. First, we
examine privacy threats based on Table 2 in order to
determine privacy threat trees. Next, we create
misuse case scenarios based on the threat tree
patterns and propose privacy requirements and
controls to mitigate these threats.

information is being collected nor their personal data
is being shared with third parties. All these situations
can result in information disclosure to which the user
has unwittingly provided their consent.

5.3.1 Privacy threat tree for information disclosure
Figure 5 refers to the privacy threat tree for
information disclosure. For the purpose of this work,
we are referring to intentional information disclosure,
which is predefined by the registry and outlined in
the privacy policy, rather than information disclosure
as a result of security exploits. Personal information
may be disclosed to other users or to a third party.
The threats related to sharing a victim’s personal data
can lead to undesirable inferences of the victim’s
behavior and personal life. A victim’s personal data
sent to a third party can be used for customer
profiling of the victim. Sharing personal data with
other users puts the physical safety of the victim at
risk if it is shared with an untrusted entity. For these
reasons, a victim may choose not to consent to
sharing their personal data depending on privacy
policy practices.

Figure 5. Information disclosure privacy
threat tree
5.3.2 Privacy threat tree for content unawareness
Figure 6 refers to the privacy threat tree for
content unawareness. Content unawareness occurs at
the victim level when the victim provides more
personal data than is required or does not read the
privacy policies. Providing too much personal data is
unnecessary and opens up opportunities for further
undesirable inferences. There is also the possibility
that a victim does not read the privacy policies and
therefore is unaware that certain aspects of their
personal data is being collected and shared. The
victims may be unaware of the purpose for which
their personal data is collected, or how it is used. The
victims may neither be aware that their personal

Figure 6. Content unawareness privacy
threat tree
5.3.3 Misuse case scenarios.
In this section, we provide a misuse case scenario
of victim’s personal information based on the threat
tree patterns. The misuse case model is based on the
LINDDUN model. The threat trees in Figures 5 and 6
indicate that to be susceptible to the threat of content
awareness, the victim either unknowingly provides
too much personal data or does not read privacy
policies. For information disclosure, the registry
forwards the data to a third party or another agent.
These are the preconditions of the misuse case. To
create the attack scenario, the attacker first needs to
have access to the registry (data store), and either the
victim (data subject) can be re-identified or the
pseudonyms can be linkable. In this scenario, the
actions of the misusing actor are actually completely
legitimate as outlined in their privacy policy.
However, the data use/sharing practices do not
comply with the victim’s expectations or legislation.
Although law 26.827, Article 45, states that the
consent of the victim to publish their data and
personal information is always required [7], the
victim may not be aware of the consequences of
making its data public or could not understood the
privacy policies. The attack case scenario is
presented below.
Title: Misuse Case 1, Content Unawareness and Information
Disclosure
Summary: victim unknowingly provides personal data to the agent
Assets, stakeholders and threats: victim’s personal information.
The victims are unaware the information is collected and sent.
Potential threats: surveillance, secondary use, disclosure,
exclusion
Primary misusing actor: victim for not reading privacy policy.
Basic flow:
Victim consents to privacy policy without reading it.
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Victim unknowingly sends personal information to the agent.
Alternative flow: Same as the above except that the agent sends
victim’s personal information to a third party for other purposes.
Trigger: Victim does not read the privacy policy that outlines the
agent’s privacy practices.
Preconditions:
Victim provides consent but has not read or understood the
privacy policies.
Victims have some sort of expectation for privacy, which does
not actually correlate with the privacy policy or the data
sharing practices of the agent.

5.3.4 Privacy requirements/controls.
Based on the above analysis of threats and
illustrative attack scenario, we now propose some
privacy requirements and controls needed to mitigate
these threats. The IETF outlines in their privacy
considerations [16] two major mitigation techniques
to deter threats of surveillance, disclosure, secondary
use and exclusion. Techniques are data minimization
and user participation:
 Data minimization: limiting collection, use,
disclosure, retention, identifiability, sensitivity, and
access to personal data to the minimal amount
necessary to perform a task. Reducing the amount of
data exchanged reduces the amount of data that can
be misused. Data minimization mitigates the threats
of surveillance, secondary use and disclosure.
 User participation: data collection and use that
happens “in secret,” without the individual’s
knowledge, is apt to violate the individual’s
expectation of privacy and may create incentives for
misuse of data. As a result, privacy regimes tend to
include provisions to support informing individuals
about data collection and use and involving them in
decisions about the treatment of their data. In an
engineering context, supporting the goal of user
participation usually means providing ways for users
to control the data that is shared about them. It may
also mean providing ways for users to signal how
they expect their data to be used and shared. User
participation mitigates the threats of surveillance,
secondary use, disclosure and exclusion.
Our threat model illustrates that the privacy
requirements are data minimization and user
participation, in order to mitigate the threats of
information disclosure and content unawareness,
which can lead to surveillance, disclosure, secondary
use and exclusion. Privacy controls, which achieve
the goals of data minimization and user participation,
include implementing a privacy access control model.

6. Conclusion and future work
In this work, we proposed an approach to
investigate the privacy of institutional violence

complaints in Argentina. The approach was adapted
from existing security and privacy methodologies.
Starting with an overview of the technical
architecture, we defined a BPMN process model for
registering victims’ complaints in a database. This
allowed us to identify personal data assets and data
flow. Next, we used the LINDDUN methodology to
identify privacy threats and threat agents, and
illustrated methods of attack through threat trees.
This allowed us observing different methods an
attacker can use to reach the data and creating misuse
case scenarios based on the threat tree patterns.
For the purpose of this paper, we addressed the
threats of information disclosure and content
unawareness in relation to an individual’s privacy
when reporting instances of institutional violence.
Aiming to minimize these threats, the identified
privacy requirements for the proposed process are
data minimization and user participation, which can
lead to surveillance, disclosure, secondary use and
exclusion.
For user participation, it is part of future work to
study how to make sure that individuals understand
the policy and in which way they could control their
own data. Future work is also concerned with
analyzing other threat categories such as linkability,
identifiability, non-repudiation and detectability. We
also plan to implement this process for surveying
institutional violence complaints in a business
process management system taking into account the
identified privacy threats and requirements.
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